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Abstract 
 
The social infrastructures that constitute both public and private administration, are increasingly 
entangled with digital code, big data, and algorithms. While some argue these technologies have 
blown apart the strictures of bureaucratic order, we see more subtle changes at work. We suggest 
that far from a radical rupture, in today’s digitizing society, there are strong traces of the logic 
and techniques of Max Weber’s bureau; a foundational concept in his account of the symbiotic 
relationship between modernity, capitalism and social order. We suggest that these logics also go 
some way to helping explain the remarkable legitimacy digital governance has acquired as they 
shape contemporary systems of social administration. We do this by exploring how digital 
technologies draw from, and give new substance to, the three key principles of Weber’s theory of 
the bureau—efficiency, objectivity, and rationality. We argue that the crucial substantive shift 
that has occurred is that these logics have been conditioned by the economization of the political 
through neoliberalism as an organizing political project, not least through the subordination of 
social ends to technical means. At the same time we argue that digitalism engenders the 
privatization of authority, not least through its ‘elective affinity’ with market logics. 
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1. New Order 
 
At the heart of our digitally mediated world is a social paradox that arcs between order and 
emancipation. On the one hand, digital technologies appear to have contributed to a new era of 
openness, adaptability, and transparency in the spheres of public and private administration1. It 
requires little effort, cost, or transportation for instance, to enroll in online university classes with 
preeminent scholars. Or, one can track passport renewals through the Home Office and know in 
every instance its change in status. We can view seemingly endless hours of legislative 
deliberation, sometimes in the form of leaked documents, from the comfort of our homes, or 
contribute to publicly visible accounts of government (in)efficiencies or corporate performance 
or through on-line ratings. 
These affordances have led celebrants of digital technologies to argue that the hierarchical 
governing typical of the classic bureaucracy has collapsed2. It is proposed that the porosity of 
boundaries around previously impervious social categories, like public and private, can be 
understood as the proverbial rusting away of the iron cage of modern bureaucratic life, giving 
rise to new freedoms, new social relations and new cognitive orientations3. In this emancipated 
world, cities are now “smart” because of constant data representations and possibilities for real-
time feedback. Science and academic research are now “open”, no longer cloistered in 
intellectual citadels. Data is now “big” and exposed to interrogation and interpretation by 
amateurs and experts alike.  
Yet, on the other hand, rather than less bureaucracy, we seem to experience its propagation 
and expansion at every turn. There has been a rapid proliferation of procedures, rules, and new 
forms of surveillance approaching what some have called “total”4 or “universal” 
bureaucratization5. Whether interacting with corporations, markets, governments, or just other 
people, contemporary life seems to be drowning in a tsunami of rule-based, digitally-mediated, 
interactions. The list is long and growing, from e-government to on-line commercial 
transactions, navigation systems, credit and identity checks, data-driven reputation tables, and so 
                                                 
1 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006) 
2
 see generally Daniel Kreiss, Megan Finn, and Fred Turner, The limits of peer production: Some reminders from 
Max Weber for the network society, 13 NEW MEDIA & SOCIETY (2011) 
3
 Id.; R.A.W. RHODES, UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE: POLICY NETWORKS, GOVERNANCE, 
REFLEXIVITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (1997) 
4 DAVID GRAEBER, THE UTOPIA OF RULES: ON TECHNOLOGY, STUPIDITY AND THE SECRET JOYS OF 
BUREAUCRACY, 18 (2015) 
5 BEATRICE HIBOU, THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE WORLD IN THE NEOLIBERAL ERA: AN 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 15 (2015) 
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on. Purchases are logged, performances are evaluated, preferences and decisions are archived, 
and suggestions are put to us based on what others are reading, doing, and thinking. 
This accumulation of data and extraction of stories is not only tied to individuals. Large data 
sets are being created and consumed by public and private institutions alike. From small spinoff 
companies to large corporations, governments to think-tanks and specialist data firms, all are 
engaged in combining, re-combining and presenting data in order to tell new stories about social 
life. Universities, publishers, and funding bodies track academic texts with digital object 
identifiers like ORCID, not unlike the radio-frequency identification (RFID) microchips 
embedded in commodities, passports, and pets, if not human bodies. Universities gather massive 
amounts of data on their researchers, teachers, and student bodies, buy space on commercial 
platforms, upload data and buy it back as reputational values. The list goes on.  
What are we to make of this state of affairs? The apparent paradox, of both greater 
transparency and greater opacity, or of emancipation, but with greater control and order, 
produces more questions than it answers6. What, for instance, does “openness” really mean, to 
whom, and in relation to what? If, as Deleuze argued, the important institutions of modernity, 
such as the factory, the school and the family, are doomed in the new “society of control”, what 
roles are digital technologies and big data playing in their reformulation7?  If the old bureaucratic 
hierarchies have come tumbling down, how do we explain greater inequalities and new forms of 
stratification? In this paper we explore these paradoxes. However, rather than argue that the old 
bureaucratic order has collapsed and that a radically new, post-bureaucratic order has now 
emerged, we suggest that key features of Weber’s political bureaucracy—efficiency, objectivity, 
and rationality—have morphed and given form to a less visible, but no less powerful digital 
bureaucracy.  
No longer is the modern bureaucracy an anonymous world of “papers in motion”8. Rather, 
the digital bureaucracy is a world of data in motion, given direction and shape by new kinds of 
digital infrastructures—from codes to algorithms to platforms, whose digital footprint replaces 
the material archive, and whose experts are the new data scientists (see Figure 1). However, like 
all institutions of rule, the new digital bureaucracy—like Weber’s classical bureaucracy, faces 
challenges to its legitimacy, especially following the erosion of the border between economic and 
                                                 
6 On this general paradox between emancipation and control, not tied directly to digital technologies, but 
nevertheless apt to our general argument, see Gilles Deleuze, Postscript on Societies of Control, 59 OCTOBER 
(1992) at 4; ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, LIQUID MODERNITY (2000) 
7 Deleuze, supra note 6 
8 PETER BERGER, BRIGITTE BERGER, HANSFREID KELLNER, THE HOMELESS MIND: MODERNIZATION 
AND CONSCIOUSNESS, 47 (1974) 
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political, and public and private life. This struggle over legitimation is intensified by the post-
modern ‘condition’ where it is seemingly impossible to form consensus around any sort of 
universal truth or knowledge claim, particularly when concerned with a social ambition9. 
Legitimation is now managed through the relative disinterest of numbers, the relative distance 
between the architects/experts managing the digital bureau and those that it is governing, and 
the relative alignment between the digital and the creation of knowledge-based economies and 
information societies.  
 The paper proceeds in the following way. We begin with an account of Weber’s notion 
of bureaucracy, focusing on its DNA: the principles of efficiency, objectivity, and rationality. We 
then review the emergence of digital technologies in the context of theories of the information 
society and economy, and transformations of the bureaucratic state as a result of neoliberal 
political projects, and show how digital technologies are changing organizational structures. We 
then revisit the three fundamental components of bureaucratic order, and investigate how they 
have changed in the digital age. In the penultimate section we explore the issue of the 
legitimation of digital governance, and show how techno-scientific rationality combined with 
neoliberal ideology have worked together to subordinate social ends to economic means. We 
conclude by questioning the future possibilities of fracturing what we call the silicon web10. 
 
2. Defining Order 
 The Oxford English Dictionary defines bureaucracy in the first instance as “Government 
by officials; a system of government or (in later use) administration by a hierarchy of 
professional administrators following clearly defined procedures in a routine and organized 
manner.11” In this organizational structure of public administration, Hegel saw the consummate 
historical manifestation of human reason and social ethics as exemplified in the Prussian state12. 
                                                 
9 David B. Clarke, Space, knowledge and consumption, in KNOWLEDGE, SPACE, ECONOMY (Bryson, Daniels, 
Henry and Pollard eds. 2000) 
10 Our invocation of a web is not unlike the sieve or mesh that Deleuze uses to describe the society of 
control. Referring to the change from Foucault’s “closed” disciplinary institutions to the relatively open 
institutions of the “society of control” he says, “Enclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a 
modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like 
a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point.” Deleuze, supra note 6, emphasis in original.  
11 "bureaucracy, n.". OED Online. March 2017. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com.openathens-proxy.swan.ac.uk/view/Entry/24905?redirectedFrom=bureaucracy 
(accessed April 07, 2017). 
12 M.W. Jackson, Bureaucracy in Hegel’s Political Theory, 18 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY, 139 (1986). 
Jackson argues that a key distinction between Hegel’s and Weber’s theories of (state) bureaucracy is that 
the former imbues bureaucracy and bureaucrats with an ethical imperative to serve the common good. 
Weber is not unconcerned with ethics, but is more interested in the autonomy of bureaucratic structures 
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Marx drew upon Hegel’s arguments, but was much more critical, in that he saw the bureaucracy 
as the direct link between civil society and the state, and as such, a symptom of the bourgeoisie’s 
influence over the state13. For Marx, then, bureaucratic public administration was one of the 
many manifestations of the class dynamics of capitalism14. 
But it was Max Weber who was particularly interested in exploring and explaining the 
institutions of state rule, and particularly how the operations of bureaucratic organization 
produced the legitimacy necessary for domination by legal-rational means15. For Weber, 
bureaucracy was the organizational manifestation of a formal techno-scientific rationality that in 
part defined modernity. However, as Berger et al. point out, whilst technologically-driven 
production and bureaucratic administration are both key phenomena of modernity, there is an 
important difference between them in that bureaucracy is not intrinsic to a particular goal—such 
as profit making16. In other words, it is not necessary that the bureaucratic form becomes 
dominant in modernity and capitalism. That said, Weber’s bureaucratic form of organization, 
whilst a contingent alignment in the sense referred to above, has nevertheless been a highly 
synergistic form for the expansion of modern capitalism, and as a primary carrier of 
modernization. 
Weber was broadly interested in how, throughout history, social domination appeared as 
a legitimate form of social order. As opposed to “traditional” or “charismatic” domination, 
which were more common in patrimonial or feudal systems, bureaucratic organization is based 
on legal domination, or power that is limited by an abstract, but codified, set of rules17. Weber 
argued that it was possible to observe bureaucratic structures throughout human history, but it 
was only in the modern industrial socio-economy that he found truly efficient and rational 
bureaucratic structures. Crucially, in the maturing industrial capitalism of the early 20th Century, 
he observed that bureaucratic ordering was important not only for public administration through 
                                                                                                                                                       
from the realm of moral-ethical or ‘political’ questions. For Weber, the bureaucracy is driven first and 
foremost by what we might today call ‘technocratic’ rationality (see the below discussion of various forms 
of Weberian rationality).  
13 NICOS P. MOUZELIS, ORGANIZATION AND BUREAUCRACY: AN ANALYSIS OF MODERN THEORIES 
(1968) 
14 DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL FORECASTING 
(1999). Marx did not spend much time on bureaucracy, particularly after his turn to economics, although 
a critical analysis of bureaucracy is implied in much of his critique of the capitalist state. For a thorough 
discussion of Marx’s and Marxism’s conceptions of bureaucracy, see Id. at 49-119.  
15 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, VOLS. 1 & 2, (Roth and Wittich eds., 1978) 
16 BERGER, ET AL., supra note 8 at 41 
17 WEBER, supra note 15 at 217-226; see generally MOUZELIS, supra note 13 
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what he called the “agency”, but also the private administration of large-scale production, or 
what he called the “enterprise”18. 
 Weber’s description of the modern bureaucracy in Chapter XI of Economy & Society19 is 
extensive, and many readers will be familiar with the key arguments. There are, however, three 
crucial characteristics of a Weberian bureaucracy that for our purposes need a clear definition at the 
outset20. The first is that the labour of bureaucratic administration is divided up into offices or 
“bureaus” constituted by professional and specialized workers who are, or have, the potential to 
become, technical experts. Bureaucratic officials are thus hired and promoted based on objective 
criteria related to this vocation or expertise. Second, the bureau is managed according to a 
codified and exhaustive set of procedures or rules, as well as through a managerial hierarchy, the 
rulings of which are subject to appeal and potential redress. And third, the bureau is constituted 
out of its management of communication and information, or what Weber called “the files”, and 
Berger et al. call “papers in motion”21. In other words, a bureaucracy is an organizational form 
reliant upon, and designed to, exert control over information, knowledge and communication22. 
 Extending his argument from these three characteristics, Weber explores the broad 
outcomes of social ordering based on these three interrelated principles that are constitutive of 
bureaucratic ordering: efficiency, objectivity, and rationality. Efficiency is a measurement of the 
appropriateness between the means and the ends as it relates to an organization’s goals23. In 
other words, to be efficient is to choose the best technique to achieve a desired result. Weber 
argues that particularly in modernity, bureaucratic structures are designed around this logic and 
they become so good at routinizing the means of achieving their ends that they resemble well-
oiled machines. He notes; “The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has 
always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully 
                                                 
18 WEBER, supra note 15 at 956 
19 Id. 956-1005 
20 We are abridging Weber’s six key characteristics of “modern bureaucracy”, Id. 956-58. Furthermore, we 
are largely referring here to Weber’s “ideal type” of bureaucracy, something he says can “seldom if ever” 
be found in the real world, WEBER, supra note 15 at 20-21. Nevertheless, we follow Weber’s suggestion 
that great analytical value can be found by exploring the essential characteristics of the bureaucratic form 
particularly in attempting to conceptualize what we see as a broad historical shift towards digitalism and 
the related contradictions of “data” obsessed governance. Simply stated, the ideal type is a starting point 
for a more concrete analysis of the bureaucratic qualities of digitalism. For a discussion of the analytical 
benefits and drawbacks of employing the ideal type of bureaucracy see MOUZELIS, supra note 13 at 38-54; 
HIBOU, supra note 5 at xiv-xv. 
21 BERGER ET AL., supra note 8 
22 Weber writes “Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally domination through knowledge. This 
is the feature of it which makes it specifically rational.” WEBER, supra note 15 at 225. see generally JAMES 
R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY (1986)  
23 MOUZELIS, supra note 13 
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developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine 
with the non-mechanical modes of production”24. 
 The second principle is the objectivity of bureaucratic operation, or autonomy from the 
influence of short-term political whims or human passions. However, as Weber observes, 
“Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is ‘dehumanized,’ the more completely it 
succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and 
emotional elements which escape calculation. This is appraised as its special virtue by 
capitalism”25. In the public realm, this bureaucratic objectivity reflects the “procedural neutrality” 
of the state26, or the broader liberal principal of the rule of law, both of which are crucial for 
maintaining the legitimacy of bureaucratic rule. In the private realm, the objectivity of 
bureaucracy relates not to politics, or a lack thereof, but rather to the management of the 
enterprise based on techno-scientific principles27. 
 Weber’s concept of rationality is notoriously difficult to define and is entangled with his 
broader arguments about modernity and cultural meaning. At its simplest, Weberian rationality is 
the socio-cultural manifestation of Western reason in the context of capitalism28. In relation to 
Weber’s discussion of bureaucratic order, rationality mainly refers to the procedural efficacy of 
bureaucratic operations. All decisions at every level of the bureaucratic hierarchy should be 
rational to the extent that they employ scientific knowledge to calculate the efficiency of the 
execution of tasks, all in a repetitive manner. Bureaucracies, according to Weber, leave little 
room for inefficiencies, and eventually become machines for ‘rationalizing’ work processes. 
 While this version of formal rationality dominates in bureaucratic capitalism, and appears 
as an imposed form of hierarchical domination, Weber’s full conception of rationality is more 
nuanced. Kalberg divides Weber’s rationality into four interrelated categories: practical, 
theoretical, substantive and formal29. In this article we are mainly concerned with the latter two, 
but the former two are also important. Practical or pragmatic rationality is the set of egoistic 
interests through which individuals evaluate mundane day-to-day decisions. At a basic level it is 
this rationality that guides routine means—ends actions. Theoretical or “intellectual” rationality 
refers to the conceptual or metaphysical framework that most humans find necessary to make 
                                                 
24 WEBER, supra note 15 at 973. 
25 Id. at 975 
26 Paul du Gay, Bureaucracy and Liberty : State, Authority, and Freedom, in THE VALUES OF BUREAUCRACY 48-
9 (du Gay ed. 2005) 
27 HIBOU, supra note 5 
28 Herbert Marcuse, Industrialization and Capitalism, I/30 NEW LEFT REVIEW (March-April 1965) 
29 Stephen Kalberg, Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in 
History, 85 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 1145 (1980) 
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meaning out of mundane daily life. This sort of rationality is not directly implicated in actions, 
but rather in thought and contemplation. Substantive rationality is the value-laden framework that 
helps individuals negotiate “…reality’s flow of unending empirical events”30. This type of 
rationality does not determine means—ends decisions in the same way that practical rationality 
does. Rather, it is a broader, albeit individualized, ethical framework or set of “value postulates”31 
through which humans determine action in particular situations. Substantive rationality is always 
in relation to a broader theoretical rationality, but it is based on an individual perspective and 
may vary across situations. Formal rationality is the depersonalized, even dehumanized, set of 
codified rules, laws, and regulations. This sort of rationality is based on scientific and economic 
calculation, is historically predominant in capitalistic societies, and is most closely associated with 
bureaucratic order.   
 In these three bureaucratic principles, Weber imagined—in the ideal—a level of 
perfection32 in social administration. As a result, he believed that historically bureaucratic 
administration would emerge as the primary form of social organization and wipe away others 
based on inheritance, myth, or charisma. But, for Weber, the adherence to rational social 
ordering by bureaucratic rationality also produced an “iron cage”, where substantive rationality 
was significantly constrained across social institutions, with non-conforming action inside 
instrumental bureaucratic structures virtually impossible33. So whilst the authority of procedure, 
and the science and hierarchy of decision making together produce a separation from whim and 
passion, the trade-off is a level of “disenchantment” that takes its toll on human creativity and 
will, if not liberty34.  
 Consequently, bureaucratic social ordering is a means of domination in both its 
hierarchical form but also as a result of its capacity to engender in individuals a substantive 
ethic—or a value system—based upon calculation and techno-scientific reason. In other words, 
capitalism is historically remarkable for its capacity to produce an affinity towards, or a unity of, 
ordering across the four categories of rationality, and increasingly beyond the formally economic 
                                                 
30 Id. at 1155 
31 Id. 
32 See generally Marcuse, supra note 28 for a lengthy discussion and critique of the normative and 
teleological implications of Weber’s theory of rationality (and bureaucracy). 
33 MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 181 (1978). The “iron cage” 
is an infamously controversial translation by Talcot Parsons from the German stahlhartes gehäuse that we 
will not attempt to adjudicate here, other than to say it could instead be translated to something akin to a 
“shell as hard as steel”. See Peter Baehr, The "Iron Cage" and the "Shell as Hard as Steel": Parsons, Weber, and 
the Stahlhartes Gehäuse Metaphor in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 40 HISTORY AND THEORY 
153-169 (2001) 
34 Michael Reed, Beyond the Iron Cage? Bureaucracy and Democracy in the Knowledge Economy and Society, in THE 
VALUES OF BUREAUCRACY (du Gay ed. 2005) 
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or scientific fields towards—particularly in neoliberal capitalism—virtually every facet of social 
life. 
 
3. In-forming Order 
For much of the 20th Century, the strengths of bureaucratic organization were 
“functionally indispensable to the operation of the modern capitalist state and enterprise”35, not 
least because of what Weber called the “increasing complexity of civilization”36. The modern 
bureaucratic state, formed from legal-rational principles and designed to cope with this 
complexity, also created a separation from both the interests of private capital, on the one side, 
and the whims of public politics, on the other. In other words, the modern bureaucratic state 
claimed its legitimacy through serving a public function—or the collective interest—by being 
blind to the influence of individuals.  
Beniger argues that it was not civilization, per se, but the increasing complexity of 
economic production, distribution, and consumption in the second industrial revolution, 
beginning in the late 19th Century, that created the conditions for the functional centrality of the 
bureaucracy37. Following advances in telecommunications which caused a “crisis of control” for 
the socio-economy, the only reasonable solution was rationalization through bureaucratic 
management. For Beniger, Weberian rationalization was a practice of “pre-processing” of 
information38, or the “destruction or ignoring of information in order to facilitate its 
processing”39. In this sense, the essence of contemporary bureaucracy is its capacity to create 
abstractions through devices like formalized codes, categories, and rules based upon, not actual 
lived experiences but  the imperative to govern life through market-like mechanisms40. In other 
words, the technological transformation of the economic system, beginning in the late 19th 
                                                 
35 Michael Reed, supra note 34 at 119 
36 WEBER, supra note 15 at 972 
37 BENIGER supra note 22.  
38 See BENIGER supra note 22 at 390-425. Beniger’s fascinating, book-length argument is impossible to 
succinctly summarize, but his description of the “control revolution” of the second industrial revolution 
is concerned first with the invention of all sorts of new information-processing technologies (broadly 
defined) such as the modern typewriter (1873), the stock ticker (1870), and the “systematization of office 
record keeping” (early 1870s), but also things like the first university business, commerce, and 
administration schools (1880s), and the US national professional organization of accountants (1886). 
More importantly, Beniger is interested in various components of the “centralized, functionally 
departmentalized organizational structure in the mid-1890s”, which was accompanied by a startling 
growth in bureaucratic workers. Compared to overall 28% growth of the US workforce between 1900-
1910, he cites a 45% growth in managers and a 127% growth in clerical workers. His argument is that 
more than anything else, these new workers were information processors.  
39 BENIGER supra note 22 at 15. 
40 HIBOU, supra note 5 at 24-32 
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Century and continuing today, which included an intensifying spatial division of labour and the 
vast circulation of raw and finished goods, necessitated a new system for sorting and sifting of 
immense amounts of information. The answer to this systemic need was the modern 
bureaucracy; it provided speed of administrative operation and unique efficiency for managing 
information. As a result, it became the model for both the corporation and the state, and thus 
private and public administration. 
 The important question for us is how—and through what kinds of processes and logics, 
and with what kinds of outcomes—have digital information technologies changed bureaucratic 
structures? The scholarly literature on digital technologies, as they relate to transformations in 
the socio-economy, is too extensive to attempt to summarize here41. There is a long history of 
theorizing the information society and economy42. This goes back at least as far as Bell’s 1973 
argument that post-industrial society would increasingly assume technical characteristics 
particularly around the importance of codified knowledge43. More recently, Castells elaborates a 
“network society” where he attempts to grasp the informational flows that underpin 
interconnection and globalization, particularly in relation to the changing dynamics of 
production44. Benkler, who concentrates on shared computing software, extends Castells’s work, 
focusing on the breakdown of centralized and hierarchical organization—or the flattening out of 
processes of production into what he calls “commons-based peer production” where 
information is no longer walled off inside organizational structures45. However, there have been 
far fewer attempts to interrogate common processes of social ordering that cut across 
institutional and organizational types46.  
 The importance of the bureaucracy as an organizing social structure, and its demise, is 
looming in the background in all of these studies. The immanent passing of bureaucratic 
                                                 
41 Although see FRANK PASQUALLE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT 
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); Christian Fuchs, Capitalism or information society? The 
fundamental question of the present structure of society,16 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL THEORY, 413 (2012); 
CHRISTIAN FUCHS, DIGITAL LABOUR AND KARL MARX (2014); Paul Langley and Andrew Leyshon 
Platform capitalism: the intermediation and capitalization of digital economic circulation, FINANCE AND SOCIETY, 
(pre-publication on web, 2017); Daniel Marcus Greene and Daniel Joseph, The Digital Spatial Fix, 13 
TRIPLE C, 223 (2015); Jim Thatcher, David O’Sullivan, and Dillon Mahmoudi, Data colonialism through 
accumulation by dispossession: New metaphors for daily data, 34 ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING D: SOCIETY 
AND SPACE, 990 (2016)  
42 ARMAND MATTELART, THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (2003); FRANK WEBSTER, THEORIES OF THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY, 3rd edition, (2006); Christian Fuchs, Capitalism or information society? The 
fundamental question of the present structure of society,16 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL THEORY, (2012) 413 
43 DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1999) 
44 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY (1996) 
45 Benkler, supra note 1 at 60 
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Networks, in MANAGING MODERNITY: BEYOND BUREAUCRACY? (Clegg, Harris and Hopfl eds. 2011). 
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ordering has been predicted since Weber theorized its emergence47. Not surprisingly, those who 
advocate ending the bureaucratic structuring of social life usually invoke some version of the iron 
cage that might be overcome through things such as information sharing, institutional 
transparency, open innovation systems, or just participation. Benkler in particular, presents a 
utopian account of the breakdown of hierarchy, organizational rigidity, and the exclusively 
private ownership of the means of production, all of which lead to increasing freedom and 
autonomy for individuals48. In collaboration with others, individuals will build networks of 
information sharing and will, in turn, liberate themselves from a reliance on the strictures of 
formalized and procedural bureaus and their incipient forms of information management.  
 Embedded in the critique of bureaucracy is a desire to separate the economic and the 
social, or at least to produce the conditions whereby social life and its reproduction need not be 
dominated by the calculative rationality of capitalist bureaucracy49. Particularly in the 1960s, the 
bureaucratic structures that became the basis of social organization in the early to mid-20th 
Century came to be seen as a tool of domination by the capitalist establishment. In the case of 
corporate bureaucratic apparatuses, they achieved domination by keeping wages low. But they 
also enshrined what were seen as outdated social values including forms of racial and gender 
discrimination and modes of secrecy, shielding tendencies toward imperialism and war, and were 
generally being criticized as an impediment to individual development50. Beginning in the 1960s 
and culminating in the 1990s, critics increasingly emphasized the rationalizing and disenchanting 
properties of bureaucracies, which fuelled a diminished legitimacy for the bureaucracy as a means 
of organizing social life. 
 If the new communications technologies of the 1980s and 1990s were part of the nascent 
reorganization of the social and new forms of consciousness, the digital technologies of today 
now constitute a fully-fledged digital way of life. Over the last 25 years, digital logics, machines, 
and techniques have moved from the background to the foreground of both capitalist 
production as well as capitalist social relations. This is closely related to the growing importance 
of information and knowledge to the production of economic value. Whilst the importance of 
discursive phenomena like the “information society” or the “knowledge economy”51 have been 
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MANAGING MODERNITY: BEYOND BUREAUCRACY? (Clegg, Harris and Hopfl eds. 2011). 
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hotly debated in economics and sociology, there is little question that 1) there is simply more 
data, information, and codified knowledge available now, and 2) as a result, its management has 
become considerably more complicated52. 
In the digital economy, consolidating control over information is no longer a secondary 
process in support of some other production process. Rather, the management and manipulation 
of data and information is itself increasingly the object of value creation53. Graeber observes that 
“…the algorithms and mathematical formulae by which the world comes to be assessed become, 
ultimately, not just measures of value, but the source of value itself”54. But in this reaction to the 
new control crisis, where information management has seemingly switched from the cost of doing 
business, to the actual object of value production, what are the consequences for the principles 
of bureaucracy? Put differently; is it possible that the visible manifestations of the bureaucracy as 
we once knew it has been transformed in this rapidly digitized and data-filled word, though its 
organizing logics remain?  
 
3.1 Intelligent efficiency 
 One of the fundamental justifications for the massive expansion of digital information 
technologies has been their purported efficiency55. Of all the reasons efficiency is important for 
capitalist social relations in the 21st Century, perhaps the two most powerful are financial and 
environmental. Not surprisingly these are also the two most crisis-prone spheres of socio-
economic life over the last decade56 . 
Whilst improving efficiency in these spheres is not unique to the digital age, it has taken 
on greater importance with the advancement of information technologies. For much of the 
political class in the US, and even more so in the UK and Europe, the financial crisis of 2008 has 
translated into drastic budget cuts or “austerity”57, in what the former UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron was fond of calling, “doing more with less”58. Cameron specifically addressed “making 
government digital” in a September 2015 speech when he labeled “efficiency” as one of his three 
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principles for “delivering a smarter state”59. With regard to the environment, reducing the carbon 
footprint of pretty much everything has become a socio-economic imperative in the face of 
human-induced climate change. Attempts to more efficiently produce and use energy are heavily 
dependent on information technologies. Just one example is the management of the electricity 
infrastructure through “smart grid” technology, which in turn is dependent on an interconnected 
system of sensors and meters that collect information about energy production and 
consumption60. Households can, for example, monitor their usage via dedicated digital tools 
aimed at teaching them the value of switching off lights in unused rooms, or appreciate the costs 
of having digitally-based equipment ‘on standby’. More broadly, whilst not actually proven to 
improve efficiency, saving time and resources is one of the key driving forces behind the 
“internet of things,”61 or better yet, the “internet of everything”62 where all kinds of everyday 
objects and devices, from the mundane to the sophisticated, are connected to wireless networks 
in hope of saving time and energy. 
 These two discourses of financial austerity and sustainable environments intersect in the 
smart city discourse63. In promises of more efficiently delivering city services, as well as reducing 
the carbon footprint of urban dwellers and institutions, the data-driven smart city represents the 
vanguard of digital bureaucratic efficiency. Smart city boosters, the most influential of whom are 
private corporations like IBM, Cisco, and Siemens, all promise to employ information and 
communication technologies to make more efficient the provision of water and electricity, trash 
and sewer administration, traffic management, and policing and public safety64. Driven by “big 
data”, it is argued that real-time visualizations in centralized control rooms and web-based data 
dashboards allow both city administrators and residents to quickly make decisions about broad 
spheres of governance and urban life65. And whilst the surveillance of the city through data 
collection, processing, and visualization represents the frontier of a new realm of urban 
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competition66 and modulated social control67, this is often justified though appeals to improving 
efficiency. 
Here the acceleration of information collection, its filtering, and new forms of provision 
at the pace of “real time” is one of the key drivers of efficiency. Crucially, however, just because 
information is available at rapid speed does not mean decisions become easier. On the contrary, 
instead of dealing with “batches” of information that may have arrived on a weekly, daily, or 
hourly basis, information now flows through the bureaucracy almost constantly68. While this real-
time flow may make some decisions easier (or just hidden through automation), it also raises 
expectations for hasty bureaucratic information management, making some decision-making 
more difficult, if not prone to dis-function and crisis69. But this acceleration is only possible 
because the process of data collection, processing and presentation has been automated so as to 
remove the necessity (or possibility) of human decisions, or at least filtered through a system of 
abstract categories to present humans with a limited number of options. This is Weberian 
efficiency writ large.  
 
3.2 Sizing up objectivity 
 Similarly, the bureaucratic principle of objectivity is changing in relation to digitization, 
though it has become no less important. Where the modern or industrial bureaucratic apparatus 
once achieved its political legitimacy through its separation of from the whims and passions of 
politics through professionalization (see Hartmann this issue), on the one hand, and its 
commitment to procedural neutrality, on the other, the digital bureaucracy would appear to 
achieve its legitimacy through apparent data and algorithmic neutrality. This is best exemplified 
through the discourse of “big data” where “big” implies not so much a large size, but that data is 
unfiltered, unadulterated, and semi-autonomous—as if it can speak for itself, or for ‘all of us’. 
These ontological assumptions about data help justify the realist conception that people, 
institutions, and technical sensors simply collect data about a world that already exists.  
There is a broadening assumption that the substance of the world is data, what Hand 
refers to as the “Dataverse”70. Similarly, Kitchin refers to the “big” dataset as “n=all”71. These 
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assumptions lead to the view that data is now everything that matters, and conversely everything 
that matters is now data72. Even for the boosters of data-led governance, this may be an 
exaggeration, but discourses like “evidence-based policy” and “data-driven governance” continue 
to nurture these views. At the same time there is a growing realization that the human brain 
cannot actually process and identify patterns out of big data without the assistance of machines; 
indeed this has become part of the definition73. For its own part, “small” data is considered 
flawed because it cannot be sufficiently separated from direct human experience and 
subjectivity74. 
 In the dataverse it is no longer professional autonomy and control of the bureaucratic 
“files” that constitute objective decision making. Rather the “post-bureaucratic organization”75 
must make sense of data in motion. Through sophisticated processes of data capture (e.g. digital 
sensors, Internet surveillance, relentless feedback surveys) governance systems have gained 
access to much more data, though in Beniger’s terms of a crisis of control, the fundamental 
problem has not changed. While gaining access to data and information continues to be a 
challenge for every institution, the crucial issue is turning data and information into useful, 
meaningful or actionable knowledge. Simply stated, the problem is not a lack of data, but 
keeping up with too much data moving at speed. 
Here the algorithm is enrolled as the perfectly objective procedural processor; a recursive 
data filtering mechanism designed to eliminate subjective and inefficient human decision-making. 
The algorithm is thus entangled in every socio-economic process that has a digital component. 
Through their capacity as routinized filtering devices, the coded algorithm brings single data 
points with little value or meaning into a relation with countless other data points in a process 
which produces a “…smoother, more predictable surface for capitalist consumption”76. While 
algorithms are designed by people and situated in particular social contexts, they also tend to 
recede into obscurity as they endow routinized operations.  
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There is in this process a tension reminiscent of Weber’s bureaucracy. On the one hand, 
there is the faceless procedure, resistant to appeals by individuals to view the client as more than 
a category or component77. On the other there is the potential to obscure corruption by 
economic or political power in a mundane, recursive process. Yet, this surface contradiction 
masks a deeper underlying logic;  in this way the algorithm has become a seamless carrier of 
modernization for the interests of both the political classes and capitalist enterprise78. Put 
differently, the practical rationality of the algorithm quite easily translates into the formal 
calculative rationality that dominates most modern capitalist organizational structures, leaving 
little room for alternative or substantive rationalities.   
 Finally in the realm of bureaucratic objectivity, we emphasize the importance of 
quantification, or what Weber called the “romanticism of numbers”79. What began in the 
emergence of statistics and modernity as an “avalanche of numbers”80 has intensified in the 
digital age. While statistical modeling was crucial to the development of the modern bureaucratic 
state, today it seems that almost everything is evaluated according to numerical indicators, 
benchmarks, ratings, and rankings. Porter referred to this as the growth of “mechanical 
objectivity”, where numbers are considered considerably more trustworthy than the modified 
templates or contextualized accounts offered by elite, professional, decision-makers81. This 
notion of objectivity is not, however, limited to facts about the external world. On the contrary, 
the mechanical objectivity of numbers is powerful because it tends to reorganize bureaucracies 
around rule-based decision making, and numbers and mathematics are better suited to the 
objectivity of rules—the most pure manifestation of which is the algorithm. As Porter says, 
“quantification is a way of making decisions without seeming to decide”82. Indeed there is 
seemingly less room for substantive human decision-making, but only because the algorithms 
have been designed to limit that capacity to begin with. In conclusion here, we suggest that 
quantification and numbers, with their distinct air of relative disinterest, do work producing 
legitimacy for the governance of the neoliberal market society, something that relative autonomy 
did for the Weberian bureaucracy and its political institutions. 
  
3.3 Remotely Rational 
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 To put it in Weber’s terms, the celebrants of the digital information revolution argue that 
digitalism has weakened domination by formal rationality by flattening and opening up the 
structures of socio-economic administration. Not least as a result of access to more knowledge 
and information, individuals have more opportunities to cultivate their own substantive 
rationalities, if not influence others by easily distributing knowledge. On the surface it certainly 
appears that formal rationality, which became most legible in the bureaucracies of modernity, has 
come under increasing pressure as widely available information and knowledge have 
‘empowered’ individual creativity, encouraged entrepreneurship, widened opportunities for social 
networking, and engendered social difference.  
Indeed, there is little doubt individuals are now more easily able to disseminate 
information. However, whether individuals are any more empowered to actually create new 
knowledge, and/or whether this knowledge has more impact on the structuring of society, is an 
entirely different inquiry. It is quite possible that individual “creativity” or entrepreneurship is 
rather more like a survival mechanism for those individuals (the vast majority) who have become 
disenfranchised from the benefits of Fordist bureaucratic structures83 such as the welfare state, 
organized labour, or just relatively stable employment in a large corporation84. 
Our argument is that whilst the bureaucratic skeleton that emerged in modernity may be 
under pressure, its ordering DNA—techno-scientific rationality—is not85. It is alternatively, 
manifesting itself in a new, digitized form. Rather than a centralized hierarchy dominated by 
professionals and managed by experts, digital information technologies and an intensified 
division of labor have dispersed bureaucratic logics making them less legible, but no less 
consequential. This is bureaucracy at relative distance. To again invoke Beniger, the digital 
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revolution has caused a new “control crisis”, the solution to which includes formal bureaucratic 
rationality, but operating at scattered locations across a hybrid of geographic scales86. 
For Hibou, the defining characteristic of bureaucracy is its capacity to formalize diverse 
and contingent social relationships into abstract categories that more easily align with calculation 
and rule-based systems87. In the Weberian bureaucracy of modernity, much of this process was 
driven by the codification of text inscribed on “papers in motion” through the bureaucratic 
structure, and their archiving in ‘the files’88. Today this formalization and abstraction happens 
through the categorization processes of digital code, which engenders both an atomized level of 
detail as well as increased mobility of information, the ultimate goal being the instantaneous 
diffusion of tightly categorized information across space in ‘real time’.  
The ability to “know” and thus manage operations at a granular level, all within the 
language of digital code, contributes to an environment where different kinds of information and 
information systems across various fields become interoperable89. And it is in this sense that 
there is an emergence of new socio-informational infrastructures90 where human bodies, 
industrial production, climate-controlled buildings, and surveillance and policing systems are 
increasingly integrated and assembled into what Kallinikos refers to as the common “institutional 
matrix” of the “modern social arrangement”91. Crucially, however, the interoperability between 
these systems is not driven only by the common language of digital code, but an automated rule-
based rationality. 
These innovations in digital technologies and their ‘rationalizations’ have contributed to 
an acceleration of the spatio-temporal dynamics of life. Weber presciently described 
communications infrastructures, as the “pacemaker of bureaucratization” and suggests that the 
speed at which public information is circulated “…exerts a steady and sharp pressure in the 
direction of speeding up the tempo of administrative reaction towards various situations”92. In 
the same way as paper files, telegraphs and radio signals in Weber’s time, the “real time” and 
automatic feedback loops93 of digitalism produces both an individual and an institutional 
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reorientation toward speed and reactivity94, which as Virilio has pointed out, increasingly 
resemble military style logistical management95. This constant and instantaneous surveillance, 
measurement, and assessment further necessitate bureaucratic alignment with algorithmic 
governance.  
Where once information and rules, or files and procedures, were separated by time and 
space, real-time algorithmic control has collapsed them into governance in motion. Governing in 
motion sets the tempo, in tune with the cognitive orientation of the neoliberal market society, on 
the one hand, and the rhythm of the digital bureaucracy, on the other. Innovation and adaptation 
in this often chaotic environment becomes not only an entrepreneurial strategy but a survival 
skill96. Individuals and institutions that are unable or unwilling to keep pace are simply left 
behind.  
This new temporal logic of instant feedback and real-time innovation is not limited to 
formal institutions and organizations. It is also integrated into the thoughts and bodies of 
workers and consumers through constant processes of valuation and measurement97. For 
instance, personal identity is increasingly entangled with social media98 as people spend 
significant time managing their online life, including the ways their identity and real-time 
locations are marketized in the ‘like economy’99.  
It is through such valuations that a different kind of future is now imagined and 
produced, in turn constituting this new organizational form. Gone is the Weberian bureaucracy’s 
assumed possibility of upward progression through large hierarchical organizations or the 
“internal labor market”100. Experience and loyalty, once valued by large organizations101, is now 
traded for the ubiquitous demeanor of “talent”, which is itself parsed as the quality of 
adaptability to novel and often chaotic conditions. Permanent disruption and innovation replace 
relative stability and security, whilst the ad hoc project team replaces Weber’s bureaucratic 
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experts102. Furthermore, the routinization that Weber identified and compared with machines has 
been intensified where seemingly almost any repetitive process can now be mechanized through 
digital algorithms leaving behind a growing reserve army of labor that puts downward pressure 
on wages103. 
There is little question that digital information technologies have reframed bureaucratic 
rationality. But instead of opening it up to alternative values they have, instead, intensified its 
techno-scientific character. While, on the surface, digital information technologies allow for the 
reproduction of existing, and cultivation of new substantive rationalities, the dominant techno-
scientific rationality of modernity is enhanced, not diluted by digitalism. Put differently, while the 
conventional bureaucratic structure appears to be disintegrated and dispersed, the social order 
engendered by information technologies transports the logic of bureaucracy more deeply into 
society. The effect is something like Bauman’s “fluid modernity”, where the market becomes the 
perfectly adaptable (price) mechanism through which to order society, and explains why as 
Hibou argues, “we are all neoliberal bureaucrats”104. 
This does not mean that hierarchical organization has disappeared. It is simply located in 
a different place—the digital platform, where the filtering and enclosure of information is more 
important than the explicit discipline and enclosure of laboring bodies on the factory floor or in 
the corporate cubical105.  
One example that has recently attracted attention is the Chinese state’s pilot “social 
credit system” where every citizen and company will be assigned a trustworthiness score106. The 
plan is for the score to automatically update based on innumerable digitally traceable social 
interactions from minor traffic violations to using the Internet to falsely accuse others, to 
whether one has provided suitable care for aging parents. Similar to credit scoring in the US, 
though on a colossal scale, the system will be fuelled by big data and driven by an algorithmic 
logic that both disciplines society as well as capital—a particular concern is fraudulent 
corporations that have, for instance, marketed tainted baby formula and all in an effort to 
improve the functioning of China’s growing market economy. As a digital footprint, the score 
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would determine the possibility of travelling abroad, placing children in particular schools, or 
even getting a seat in a top restaurant. This is a fascinating example of the transformation of 
more conventional state bureaucracy into a digitized social order; one where the formal 
rationality of quantification and calculation now give new form to efficiency, objectivity and 
rationality. Not unlike a conventional bureaucracy, there is little room here for substantive 
interpretation, exceptions, or alternatives, and while the authority of the state may be less visible, 
there is little question it is operating in the shadow of the platform.  
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4. Digital Neoliberalism Means (and Ends) 
 
Our 21st Century communication network, regarded by its early adherents with 
a religious fervor, has been turned into a surveillance and advertising 
mechanism. The World Wide Web is just that—a web that ensnares everyone 
who uses it. 
 
--T Bone Burnett, September, 2016107 
 
 
 What, then, of the politics surrounding these digital transformations? Does society, or 
the public, retain any power to decide how—if at all—these technologies should be employed to 
achieve particular ends? In other words, might one assume that these technologies are ultimately 
subject to both individual human will and/or democratic institutions? At least in the current 
political environment, on these questions our answers are relatively pessimistic. In this section 
we outline our main reasons for this pessimism. They are all related to the erosion of the 
boundary between the social and the economic that is one of the key characteristics of neoliberal 
order108. As mentioned above, erosion of this boundary is one of the qualities of a conventional 
bureaucratic structure where formal calculative rationality tends to dominate, but we see an 
intensification of this erosion in neoliberalism. As a result, the possibility of a social ethics—one 
where social ends might be agreed upon or even just debated—is seriously diminished. 
While Weber explains the efficiency of bureaucracies in the terms of appropriate means 
to achieve particular ends, he is not naïve about the possibility of the means becoming a driving 
force. In fact, one of the enduring criticisms of bureaucracy is that it becomes internally obsessed 
with its own reproduction and loses sight of its larger purpose. Weber explains at length how 
difficult it can be to dislodge a bureaucratic structure once it is firmly in place109. Castells, who is 
more explicitly critical of bureaucracy actually defines the organizational type by the 
characteristic of a focus on means over ends110.  
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Nevertheless, during the post-World War II height of Fordism, embedded liberalism, or 
what Bauman called “solid modernity”111, the bureaucratic welfare states of Western Europe and 
the US were largely successful in producing socially beneficial ends. Inequality was reduced, the 
social safety net protected the most vulnerable, speculative finance was tightly controlled, and 
supported by state institutions, capital and labor compromised to the benefit of the working and 
middle classes. 
 Furthermore, there was during the middle of the 20th Century a widespread assumption 
of a socially progressive telos. One of the key components of modernity was that modernization 
would deliver, over time, “development” for all nation-states, especially those in the Global 
South112. There was a widespread notion that intellectual knowledge or reason, operationalized 
through science and technology, and enabled to do public work through rationalized politics, 
would eventually improve the conditions for everyone. While this linear development model, 
envisioned by scholars such as Walt Rostow, was in many ways flawed (i.e. “written” from the 
Global North and largely build on racist, colonial, and imperial logics, as well as carried out 
through highly gendered and racist institutions), it was also based on the ethos that those 
individuals who “played by the rules”, or abided by the dominant rationality, would be rewarded. 
In other words, it was assumed that science and technology enacted through formal and 
relatively rigid social structures were the means to a broader end of social development.  
 The digital as a basis of social organization, comes at a time when this imagined telos of 
modernity has largely disappeared, and been replaced with a neoliberal capitalist ethos, where 
economic development is both the means and the end of social development. After the ‘end of 
history’, or the end of actually existing communism, it is much more difficult to theorize an 
outside to capitalism, or invoke social emancipation and development as a public good outside 
of the terms, motives, and means of private profit and economic growth113. This is not to suggest 
that modernity was somehow purely driven by emancipatory goals. The seeds of the post-
modern obsession with creative destruction, ephemerality, and uber-flexibility, were important 
parts of both enlightenment thought and the social structures of modernity114. These qualities 
simply became more dominant in the socio-cultural structures of post-modernism, or what in 
political-economic terms we should call neoliberalism.  
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These conditions have worsened since the 1970s to the point where there is now hardly 
the political possibility of debating, let alone mandating, social ends via state means. As Davies 
points out, the more that the state relies on the calculative rationality of markets in an effort to 
appear objective and in turn regain legitimacy, the less authority it is able to retain115. The 
neoliberal state, having mostly given up on appealing to an external social referent, has lost the 
moral authority to act in most social contexts. Instead the state is dominated by economic and 
financial calculation. However this logic hardly lends itself to widespread legitimacy to 
accomplish anything other than constant attempts to reproduce the conditions for economic 
growth, or to just reproduce the market itself. In the US and the UK in particular, this has 
contributed to a deligitimation of any sort of public administration, in many cases reducing state 
bureaucracy to its capacity to encourage competition between private actors. 
These conditions are only worsened in an environment where both the state and private 
capital are in increasingly adopting the general logic of mechanized technologies—or what Ellul 
calls “technique”116. Carried by digital technologies, and emboldened by hegemonic discourses 
around the centrality of technical innovation, every social process now seems to be subject to the 
‘disruptive’ forces of, and potential within, the digital. Ellul’s point, made in the 1950s, was that 
technical procedures and processes were no longer something that “man” put to use for 
particular ends, but that technique had become an end in itself. He called it “the consciousness 
of the mechanized world” that “…does in the domain of the abstract what the machine did in 
the domain of labor”117. For Ellul, technique had become the very substance of society. This 
matters because digital code, the digital algorithm, and the digital platform are nothing if not 
dominated by the recursive logic of machines118. In this sense, the digital machines that drive 
social administration are examples of a perfectly calculative apparatus. 
This also helps explain why there is an “elective affinity”, between market ‘solutions’ to 
political problems and the reformatted principles of bureaucracy in the digital age. Setting aside 
the contradictions of technological advance in capitalism, in the sphere of private enterprise it is 
relatively straightforward that capital would put digital means to work to achieve the ends of 
competing for profitability in the market. But in the sphere of public administration, the 
neoliberal evacuation of collective goals plug into the relative disinterest of digitized objectivity 
and the relative distance between state bureaucrats and the governed, separated by the 
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formalization of the algorithm or the rationalization of the platform. For a neoliberal thinker like 
Hayek, market mechanisms ought to replace centralized and relatively autonomous state 
bureaucracies exactly because they wrongly assume to grasp social ends. In this sense, 
encouraging the marketization of the pre-processing of bureaucratic information through 
routinized filters aligns perfectly with neoliberal ideology by doubly removing the possibility of 
public interference—once through the private market and once through technique. After all, for 
many neoliberals, the market is assumed to take the place of human knowledge and judgment, if 
not turning ignorance of anything resembling society into a virtue119. 
To summarize, the emergence of digital media has been concurrent with the emergence 
of a neoliberal political economy which is consonant with a bureaucratic rationality where 
innovation, adaptability, and efficiency are the functional means, but without the progressive 
ends. In other words, innovation, adaptability and efficiency are the means without purpose or 
intent—at least outside of the logics of wealth accumulation. They are the means and the ends. 
This is driven by what Davies120, gesturing to Weber, calls the “disenchantment of politics” 
where political discourse is delegitimized as ambiguous, subjective and irrational121. In neoliberal 
politics there is little room for a discussion of public goods122, and discussions of society are 
almost exclusively framed by ‘financial realities’. 
 
 
5. Concluding Thoughts (in Motion) 
 
These pieces are written at that border between what one knows and what one 
thinks it might be possible to think, between what little one grasps and the 
great gulf of ignorance which that partial grasp reveals. 
--Nikolas Rose—Powers of Freedom123 
 
 In writing this paper, we have constantly found ourselves writing at the edge of our 
capacity to grasp, in part because our cognitive frames for understanding are anchored in a 
relatively distant world, and in part because information economies and the “data revolution” 
conceal so much of what could and should be revealed. Not only is it difficult to bring some of 
these processes into clear view, it is even harder to predict just what sort of society will emerge 
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over the next generations as digital technologies become ever more prevalent in daily life. Where 
will the line fall between a world fully engrossed with data in motion, and a world where new, 
non-digital, possibilities emerge? Put another way, will data in motion over-determine, for 
example, the future shape of the globally-ranked university, as it becomes a recursive socio-
technical machine for producing ranking data. Will the city cease to be a system of living and 
working communities, but rather become a recursive engine for producing smart city 
efficiencies? Will the logistical management of the socio-economy no longer be a coordinating 
undercurrent, but the productive object of value itself? If the answer to these sorts of questions 
is “yes”, the silicon web may be more like Weber’s iron cage than even our relatively gloomy 
account has suggested.  
There is considerable risk that governing the social, already significantly de-legitimated by 
neoliberalism, is further undermined by digitalism. When relative autonomy is replaced by the 
projection of relative disinterest, and where Westphalian democratic orders are undermined by 
governing in motion, and governing through relative distance, shortfalls in legitimacy emerge and 
questions of rule are posed. In other words, if digital technologies are no longer just tools we 
employ to accomplish tasks but they become the task and the object itself, as well as an authority 
in neoliberal market societies, the ethics of public or democratic authority will continue to suffer. 
This is where we must consider the very possibility that the logic of the algorithm is more than 
that which drives the digital machine. Rather, we need to ask to what extent the logic of the 
algorithm is the new ordering and organizing device of social opportunities, identities, 
consciousness and life itself? We ought to furthermore ask if there are limits to a mode of 
production that seems to produce profits by rationalizing social order itself.  
Undoubtedly, social systems are unpredictable and difficult to enclose. Even recursive 
algorithms engaging in real time with the social world will occasionally produce the unexpected. 
Viewed in this way, it is likely that the diffusion of information and the forms of consciousness 
and socialities that are opened up might well prove too difficult to contain in a metaphoric 
silicon web. In this light, “hacktivist” culture is something to be celebrated. Just as there was 
nothing inevitable about the advancement of modernity through the conventional bureaucracy, 
the growth of digitized bureaucratic administration is contingent and reversible. Nevertheless, as 
long as society and economy continue to produce exponentially more data and information, the 
principles of efficiency, objectivity and rationality continue to drive social administration, and the 
private accumulation of capital is the goal of economic life, we believe the silicon web will only 
become more sticky, rigid, and difficult to dismantle. 
 
